We analyze third degree price discrimination by an upstream monopolist to a continuum of heterogeneous downstream …rms. The novelty of our approach is to recognize that customizing prices may be costly, which introduces an interesting trade-o¤. As consequence, partial price discrimination arises in equilibrium. In particular, we show that ine¢ cient downstream …rms receive personalized prices whereas e¢ cient …rms are charged a uniform price. The extreme cases of complete price discrimination and uniform price arise in our setting as particular cases, depending on the cost of customizing prices.
Introduction
In this paper, we analyze third degree price discrimination by an upstream monopolist. Third degree price discrimination can be de…ned as the possibility of charging di¤erent linear prices to di¤erent (groups of) customers. In order for price discrimination to be feasible it must be possible to separate di¤erent (groups of) customers, which is called market segmentation.
The seller must also be able to keep resales from occurring. There has been a long debate on the competitive e¤ects of price discrimination. The Robinson-Patman Act, for example, makes it unlawful to discriminate in price between di¤erent purchasers if the e¤ect of the discrimination may substantially lessen competition or create a monopoly.
Many papers, have studied the welfare e¤ects of price discrimination. For the case of …nal good markets we can mention, among others, Robinson (1933) , Schmalensee (1981) , Varian (1985) and Schwartz (1990) . However, as Yoshida (2000) recognizes "the vast majority of legal and other policy disputes over price discrimination concern input market, not …nal good markets". Then, it seems important the analysis of cases where the discriminating monopolist is an input supplier and the buyers are downstream …rms producing a …nal good. In this setting, Katz (1987) and DeGraba (1990) show that price discrimination lowers welfare, because low cost downstream …rms are charged higher prices. Total output, however, does not change as a consequence of price discrimination. Yoshida (2000) constructs a model where total output does change and obtains that an increase in total output is a su¢ cient condition for a welfare decrease.
In a recent paper, Liu and Serfes (2004) introduce a possible limitation to the extent of price discrimination. They study a setting where …rms can acquire costly consumer information that allows them to re…ne market segmentation. It is shown that …rms only invest when the quality of information is good enough.
In the present paper, we study another limitation to price discrimination, namely, that customizing prices is costly. This introduces an interesting trade-o¤ in the analysis: the gains of price discrimination have to be compared with its costs, which will allow us to endogenously determine the extent of price discrimination. Notice that our paper is close in spirit to Liu and Serfes (2004) in the sense that in both papers price discrimination involves a costly investment that imposes a trade-o¤ on the decision to price discriminate. However, the nature of the investment is very di¤erent. Whereas in Liu and Serfes (2004) it allows to improve market segmentation, in our paper it allows to customize prices. To the best of our knowledge, this possibility has been neglected by the literature.
We consider an upstream monopolist selling an input to a continuum of downstream …rms producing an homogeneous good. We assume that downstream …rms are heterogeneous in their production cost. Transactions between the upstream supplier and downstream …rms occur either at a common posted price or at a personalized price. The latter option requires a costly speci…c investment in the form of a link that allows the upstream …rm to adjust the supply contract to the individual characteristics of the …rms 1 . In other words, the creation of links allows the upstream …rm to price discriminate among its linked customers. Price discrimination is pro…table because …rms'di¤erences in costs translate into di¤erent elasticity of input demands. In particular, it is the case that the higher the cost of a downstream …rm the higher its input demand elasticity. Therefore, the upstream …rm would like to adjust upwards the wholesale price for low cost …rms and downwards for high cost …rms, knowing that the personalized contract will only be accepted if it o¤ers a discount with respect to the posted price.
Regarding the creation of links, we will analyze two possible cases: on the one hand, the links are created by the upstream …rm in a centralized way; on the other hand, each downstream …rm decides whether to establish a link with the upstream …rm.
In the …rst case, the upstream …rm prefers to connect high cost …rms, because low cost …rms would reject the personalized contract whenever the posted price market exists. In the second case, we have that the gains of creating a link for downstream …rms are increasing in their costs, because the higher their costs the higher the discount they will receive in the personalized contract. This explains that, again, market is segmented such that high cost …rms create links and are treated personally and low cost …rms attend the posted price market.
In both cases, in equilibrium, some …rms will receive a personalized price while others will be supplied at a common price. Therefore, we have a model of partial price discrimination.
The extreme cases of complete price discrimination and uniform pricing, studied in the earlier literature, will arise in our setting as particular cases when the cost of the links vanishes and when it is large enough.
Regarding the e¤ect of (partial) price discrimination on social welfare, things are simpli…ed because we get the result that total output does not depend on the distribution of links. Then (partial) price discrimination only a¤ects total production costs. Given that the upstream …rm through price discrimination subsidizes ine¢ cient …rms, total cost increases, which reduces social welfare. Therefore, in our context, we could prescribe not to allow for price discrimination.
In the last section of the paper, we apply the model to the case where the links are provided by an intermediary …rm. We can imagine the intermediary as a Business-to-Business (B2B) …rm that allows for online communications and transactions between buyers and sellers in exchange for a per-transaction fee. We consider the case of a non-industry participant.
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Observe that e-commerce is a good illustration of our model, given that, price discrimination is a common practice in the Internet. For example, one implication that has already been noticed in the business press is that the extent of the information obtained in Internet opens new possibilities for …rms to price discriminate. One very important information that sellers can obtain come from the past purchase record of their customers ("(i)t [Safeway] uses its website for (...) collecting and mining data on consumer's preferences both from the site and from loyalty cards, so it can personalize promotions"(The Economist June 24th 1999).
Another advantage of Internet is that as communication is personal, price cuts are only observed by targeted sellers. The following quotation of the FTC Report on "Competition Policy in the world of B2B Electronic Marketplaces"clari…es the situation "(...) sellers can 2 In practice, the fast growth of the e-commerce has induced also large …rms to organize their own B2B to manage their relationships with customers and suppliers (Milliou and Petrakis, 2004) . For example, in 1999, Ford and General Motors announced that their huge purchasing operations would be transferred to the web. customize price lists to re ‡ect agreements reached with speci…c buyers but ensure that those prices can be viewed only by the intended buyers".
We consider that a link between the upstream …rm and a particular downstream …rm is created only when both pay a subscription fee charged by the intermediary …rm. We obtain partial price discrimination as the equilibrium outcome of an extended game where the cost of creating links is endogenously chosen by an intermediary …rm. We obtain as before that high cost …rms are the ones treated personally. Moreover, we obtain that the burden of the (endogenous) cost of price discrimination mainly falls over the downstream side of the market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we present the general model, solving it for the cases where the upstream …rm and downstream …rms choose the links respectively. In Section 3, we apply the model to the case where the links are provided by an intermediary …rm. Finally, the last section discusses the results and opens new avenues for future research.
The Model
We assume that there is an upstream monopolist producing an intermediate good at no cost.
There also exists a continuum of downstream …rms that transform this input on a one-for-one basis into a …nal homogeneous good. The cost of this transformation for downstream …rm i is given by:
Downstream …rms are heterogeneous in parameter c i , which is assumed to be uniformly distributed among them in the interval [0,1]. Market demand is given by P (Q) = A Q.
The timing of the game is as follows:
In the …rst stage, the links are created. We will consider two di¤erent possibilities, namely, either they are chosen in a centralized way by the upstream …rm or they are decided individually by downstream …rms. In any case, the cost of creating a link is f .
In the second stage, the upstream …rm decides a uniform wholesale price w to supply the input to the …rms attending the posted price market and an individual wholesale price of the form w i = b ac i to be o¤ered to each linked downstream …rm, where a and b are the parameters to be chosen by the upstream …rm.
In the third stage, downstream …rms decide how many units to buy from the upstream …rm and how many units to sell to …nal consumers. We allow linked …rms to attend the posted price market and, therefore, they will make use of the personalized contracts only when w b ac i .
We look for the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game solving it by backward induction.
Solving explicitly this game is complex. Moreover, as we show below, in order to obtain the equilibrium distribution of links, which is our main interest, it is enough to solve a simpli…ed version of the game (called Game I) where linked …rms do not have the option to be supplied in the posted price market. Very nicely, we will show that there is a strong relationship between the equilibria of Game I and the equilibria of our original game.
In the third stage, as we have a continuum of …rms, they behave as price taking …rms.
On the one hand, linked …rm i chooses output q i to maximize its pro…ts:
This leads to the following individual supply function for linked …rm i:
On the other hand, the individual supply of a non-linked …rm j is similarly obtained and amounts to:
The market clearing condition is given by:
This leads to the following equilibrium price:
where z is the mass of set N (hence, the mass of set L amounts to 1 z),
This will be the equilibrium if all downstream …rms produce at this price. This is the case if b, w 2A 3 1, 0 a 1 and A > 6.
In the second stage, and given the set of linked …rms, the monopolist chooses the personalized wholesale prices and the price to be charged in the posted price market to maximize:
where superscript I denotes Game I:
The optimal contracts are given by 3 :
Notice that, due to the linearity of the model, the personalized contract does not depend on the distribution of links. Plugging (2.2) into (2.1) we get the equilibrium price:
Observe that the equilibrium price does not depend on the distribution of links either 4 .
The equilibrium pro…ts of the upstream …rm amounts to:
where r = R L c 2 i dc i . In the …rst stage, we have to derive the equilibrium distribution of links depending on whether the links are created by the upstream …rm or by downstream …rms. We analyze each case in turn.
The upstream …rm chooses the links.
We proceed to characterize the …rst stage equilibrium of Game I. The decisions of the upstream …rm are (1) to choose the number of unconnected …rms (that amounts to decide the mass z of set N ) and (2) to decide the distribution of connected and unconnected …rms (that amounts to the choice of terms x and r in the pro…t expression).
In the following lemma, we …nd the distribution of connected …rms that maximizes (2.3), for a given measure 1 z of linked …rms. Observe that this amounts to maximize x 2 + rz. 
We show that these distributions are not optimal because the payo¤ can be increased changing b, given that it is strictly convex in b.
which can be rewritten as:
The second derivative is given by:
The convexity of the payo¤ function implies that these distributions do not maximize the pro…ts of the upstream …rm. If we allow the upstream to choose parameter b, it will choose either b = a or b = d c increasing its pro…ts. In any case, the set [b; b + c] will not be any longer an "island"of linked …rms. Iterating this process, we will end up with a distribution of linked …rms included in set B in the lemma and, given the convexity, in all the process the payo¤ of the upstream …rm increases. Now, in order to check that any distribution in the lemma is optimal, observe that he payo¤ of the upstream …rm with any these distributions is:
We obtain the …rst derivate:
Rearranging terms we obtain that the function is constant in s:
Therefore, all the distributions in the lemma yield the same payo¤.
In order to understand the intuition behind the above result observe that, if all …rms were linked, every …rm would be charged a personalized price equal to w i = A 2 c i 2 . Given that connecting …rms is costly, a subset of …rms will not be linked and they will be charged a price that is an average of their personalized prices. The gain of price discrimination is higher the higher the di¤erence between the personalized prices and the posted price, which is achieved by linking the …rms with more "extreme"cost parameters.
Let us consider again the original game. The following lemma relates the equilibrium payo¤ of the upstream …rm in the second stage of both games. Proof. In Game I, let us de…ne the maximal value of I (L; a; b; w) as I (L):
In the original game, let us de…ne the payo¤ of the upstream …rm given the contracts 
The …rst equality is driven by the fact that in both cases we have the same set of linked …rms and the contracts are also the same. In this case, we will have the same equilibrium market price and the same payo¤s.
If Z = L and (a 0 ; b 0 ; w 0 ) = (a ; b ; w (L)), the two inequalities transform into equalities.
If Z = L, and (a 0 ; b 0 ; w 0 ) 6 = (a ; b ; w (L)), the …rst inequality is strict.
If Z L the second inequality is strict and comes from the fact that the equilibrium payo¤s in Game I increase by adding links. To prove that assume that …rms in the interval (1 z)f: (2.4)
We are now ready to establish the main result of this Section. 
Observe that the size of demand (A) does not a¤ect the set of linked …rms. Of course, it a¤ects upstream gains and losses of connecting downstream …rms, but in the aggregate these e¤ects cancel out. Notice that creating a link has a direct positive e¤ect of allowing the upstream …rm to personalize the contract, which is indeed increasing in A. On the other hand, there is an indirect e¤ect because the upstream …rm will adjust upwards the price in the posted price market. It turns out that this indirect e¤ect is decreasing in A and it exactly cancels out with the direct e¤ect.
Downstream …rms choose the links.
First of all, we show that an equilibrium with connected …rms is de…ned by a cut-o¤ value z such that all …rms in [z; 1] get connected.
Assume a candidate equilibrium set L of linked …rms. Denote by a + , b + and w + the equilibrium contracts given this distribution of links. Then, it must be the case that a downstream …rm with cost c i is connected in equilibrium if and only if:
In other words, a …rm i is connected in equilibrium only if its personalized price is lower than the posted price. But then, the maximization program of the upstream …rm is such that the restriction that linked …rms only use the personalized contract if it o¤ers better terms that the posted market is not binding. This implies that the optimal contracts will be the same as when linked …rms can not attend the posted price market (Game I). They are given by (see 2.2) :
where z = R N dc i and x = R N c i dc i . Plugging the optimal contracts into expression (2.5), we obtain:
We now check that this function is strictly decreasing in c i :
This implies that if (2.5) is satis…ed for a …rm with cost parameter c i , it must also hold for less e¢ cient …rms. In other words, the equilibrium must have a cuto¤ structure, where only high-cost …rms decide to establish a link.
Next, we have to look for the equilibrium value of z. If …rms with c i 2 [z; 1] are connected, the optimal posted price in Game I is A 2 z 4 and it is higher than the personalized price received by any linked …rm:
Then, by using Lemma 2.2, we know that the original game has the same equilibrium contracts as Game I.
Therefore, in order to calculate the equilibrium value of z we have to solve:
It has only one solution in [0; 1], denoted by z . Then, the equilibrium distribution of links is given in the following proposition. 
Observe that when f 8A 13 192 = f max , no …rm creates a link in equilibrium.
We have that the number of links created is decreasing in f and increasing in A: Comparing Propositions 2.3 and 2.4, we can conclude that more links are created when downstream …rms create the links than when the upstream …rm creates the links. In the former case, the …rms that invest in the link impose a negative externality on the …rms that remain in the posted price market, in the form of a higher wholesale price. This leads downstream …rms to create too many links. In fact, if they could decide the number of links in order to maximize joint downstream pro…ts, they would create no link at all. In the latter case, the upstream …rm takes into account the externality when deciding the number of links to be created. As we have seen, as a result, it creates less links.
Regarding social welfare, it is crucial to notice that total output does not depend on the distribution of links. Then (partial) price discrimination only a¤ects costs. We know that the upstream …rm through price discrimination subsidizes ine¢ cient …rms what increases total costs. Then welfare will be maximized when price discrimination is forbidden. the third stage equilibrium price does not depend on x S . Therefore, in order to maximize social welfare it is enough to minimize total costs (production and linking costs). Production costs will be minimized when marginal costs, wholesale price excluded (c i + 2q i ), are the same in equilibrium for all downstream …rms. This can be the case only when all downstream …rms receive the same wholesale price i.e. when all …rms attend the posted price market. Then he would set a prohibitively large tax so that no …rm gets connected.
3. The case of endogenous cost. To solve the second stage, we have to recall the result when the upstream chose the links and f = s u . She would like to connect the …rms in the set [z u (s u ); 1]. But now for the link to be completed the upstream …rm has to be sure that the corresponding downstream …rm will pay the fee. Then in equilibrium she will pay the fee for …rms in
In the …rst stage the objective of the intermediary is given by:
It is easy to see that in equilibrium it must be the case that s u and s d are chosen so that . As the intermediary …rm …nds pro…table to create links it will set the subscription fee at a lower level than this limit. Observe that the pro…table side of the market is the downstream sector where the subscription fee grows without bound. In fact, even the existence of a small transaction cost (k) of collecting the fees of the upstream …rm would induce the intermediary …rm to provide the connection to the upstream …rm for free. A su¢ cient condition for this to hold is that k 1 128
, an upper bound of the revenues obtained from the upstream …rm in the model. Summarizing, we obtain partial price discrimination as the equilibrium outcome of an extended game where the cost of creating links is endogenously created by an intermediary …rm. We obtain as before that high cost …rms are the ones treated personally. Moreover, we obtain that the burden of the (endogenous) cost of price discrimination mainly falls over the downstream side of the market.
Discussion and conclusion.
The literature on third-degree price discrimination has mainly focused on its e¤ect on social welfare. Pro…tability of price discrimination was taken for granted given that no cost was associated to it. Our contribution to the literature is to recognize that customizing prices may be costly, which creates an interesting trade-o¤. The upstream …rm, before deciding whether to personalize the price of a customer, has to balance its possible gains with its cost. As a result, he decides to pay the cost for his most valuable customers and charge a uniform price to the rest of …rms. We name this situation as partial price discrimination and encompasses as particular cases those of uniform price and complete price discrimination that have focused the attention of the literature so far.
For simplicity we have analyzed a simple case where the upstream …rm perfectly distinguishes the cost of every individual …rm; that is we assume a complete information framework. It would be interesting to analyze the polar case where the cost is private information of each …rm. This would limit the ability of the upstream …rm to price discriminate and would change dramatically the structure of the model. This is indeed part of our research agenda and it will be studied in a separate paper. 
